Classically in combinatorics on words one studies unavoidable regularities that appear in sufficiently long strings of symbols over a fixed size alphabet. In this paper we take another viewpoint and focus on combinatorial properties of long words in which the number of occurrences of any symbol is restritced by a fixed constant. We then demonstrate the connection of these properties to constructing multicollision attacks on so called generalized iterated hash functions.
Introduction
In combinatorics on words, the theory of 'unavoidable regularities' usually concerns properties of long words over a fixed finite alphabet. Famous classical results in general combinatorics and algebra such as theorems of Ramsey, Shirshov and van der Waerden can then be straightforwardly exploited ( [2] , [9] , [11] , [12] , [13] ). The theory can be applied in the study of finiteness conditions for semigroups and (through the concept of syntactic monoid) also in regular languages and finite automata. To give the reader a view of the traditional basic results in unavoidable regularities we list some of its most noteworthy achievements.
Ramsey's Theorem immediately implies
Theorem 1 (Repeated Patterns [2]) For all positive integers m and n there exists a positive integer R(m, n) satisfying the following. Given an alphabet A and a partition {A i } m i=1 of A + into m sets, if w ∈ A + is any word of length at least R(m, n), then w is in A *
A n j A * for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. Let A be an alphabet totally ordered by <. We extend the order < to the lexiographic order < lex of A * as follows. For all u, v ∈ A * : u < lex v if either v ∈ uA + or u = xay and v = xbz for some x, y, z ∈ A * and a, b ∈ A for which a < b.
Given a positive integer n, the word w ∈ A * is n-divided if there exist words u, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , v in A * such that w = ux 1 x 2 · · · x n v and w < lex ux σ (1) x σ (2) · · · x σ (n) v for any nontrivial permutation σ : {1, 2, . . . , n} → {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Theorem 2 (Shirshov [8, 9, 12]) Let A be an alphabet of k symbols and p and n positive integers with p ≥ 2n. There then exists a positive integer S(k, p, n) such that any word in A * of length at least S(k, p, n)
either is n-divided or contains a pth power of a nonempty word of length at most n − 1.
Let w = a 1 a 2 · · · a m where a i ∈ A for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. A cadence of w is any sequence (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i s ) of integers such that 0 < i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i s and a i 1 = a i 2 = · · · = a i s . Combinatorial problems are also encountered in information security, for example, when designing and investigating hash functions, techniques used in message authentication and digital signature schemes. A hash function of length n (where n ∈ N + ) is a mapping H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . For computing resource reasons, practical hash functions are often iterative, i.e., they are based on some finite compression function and an initial hash value. For more details, see subsection 3.1.
An ideal hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a (variable input length) random oracle: for each x ∈ {0, 1} * , the value H(x) ∈ {0, 1} n is chosen uniformly at random.
There are three main security properties that usually are required from a hash function H: collision resistance, preimage resistance, and second preimage resistance.
Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find x, x ′ ∈ {0, 1} * ,
Preimage resistance: Given any y ∈ {0, 1} n , it is computationally infeasible to find x ∈ {0, 1} * such that H(x) = y.
Second preimage resistance: Given any x ∈ {0, 1} * , it is computationally infeasible to find
If we want to consider the resistance properties mathematically, the concept 'computationally infeasible' should be rigorously defined. Then the security of H is compared to the security of a random oracle.
We thus say that H is collision resistant (or possesses the collision resistance property) if to find x, x ′ ∈ {0, 1} * , x = x ′ , such that H(x) = H(x ′ ) is (approximately) as difficult as to find z, z ′ ∈ {0, 1} * , z = z ′ , such that G(z) = G ′ (z ′ ) for any random oracle hash function G of length n.
The concepts of preimage resistance and second preimage resistance can be defined analogously. Given a set C ⊆ {0, 1} * of finite cardinality k > 1, we say that C is an k-collision on H if H(x) = H(x ′ ) for all x, x ′ ∈ C. Any 2-collison is also called a collision (on H).
The sharpened definitions allow us to define a fourth security property, the so called multicollision resistance: The hash function H is multicollision resistant if, for each k ∈ N + , to find an k-collison on H is (approximately) as difficult as to find an k-collison on any random oracle hash function G of length n.
Our conciderations are connected to multicollison resistance. Given a message x = x 1 x 2 · · · x l where x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l are the (equally long) blocks of x, the value of a generalized iterated hash function on x is based on the values of a finite compression function on the message blocks x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l . A nonempty word α over the alphabet {1, 2, . . . , l} may then tell us in which order and how many times each block x i is expended by the compression function when producing the value of the respective generalized iterated hash function. Since the length of messages vary, we get to consider sequences of words α 1 , α 2 , . . . in which, for each l ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, the word α l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} * is related to messages with l blocks. Practical applications state one more limitation: given a message of any length, a fixed block is to be consumed by the compression function only a restricted number (q, say) of times when computing the generalized iterated hash function value. Thus in the sequence α 1 , α 2 , . . . we assume that for each l ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, the number |α l | m of occurrences of the symbol m in the word α l is at most q.
What can be said about the general combinatorial properties of the word α l when l grows? More generally: which kind of unavoidable regularities appear in sufficiently long words in which the number of occurrences of any symbol is bounded by a fixed constant?
As is easy to imagine, the regularities in the words α l weaken the respective generalized iterated hash function against multicollision attacks. This topic was first studied in [3] , see also [4, 10, 1, 6, 7, 5] . We shall present combinatorial results on words which imply that q-bounded generalized iterated hash functions are not multicollision resistant.
We proceed in the following order. In the next section basic concepts are briefly given. In the third section we first introduce the basics of generalized iterated hash functions. The connection to combinatorics on words is then established. The fourth section contains the necessary combinatorial results. Finally, the last section contains conclusions and further research proposals.
Preliminaries
Let N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} be the set of all natural numbers and N + = N \ {0}. For each finite set S, let |S| be the cardinality of S that is to say, the number of elements in S.
Let A be a finite alphabet and α ∈ A + . The length of the word α is denoted by |α|; for each a ∈ A, let |α| a be the number of occurrences of the letter a in α, and let alph(α) denote the set of all letters occurring in α at least once. The empty word is denoted by ε. A permutation of A is any word
. . , a s ∈ B, and a i = a i+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , s − 1.
Hash functions and collisions
In this section we first present a compact lead-in to (generalized) iterated hash functions. Later we wish to point out how certain results in combinatorics on words are interconnected to successful multicollision construction on these type of hash functions.
Introduction to (generalized) iterated hash functions
Let m, n ∈ N + be such that m > n. Then H = {0, 1} n is the set of hash values (of length n) and B = {0, 1} m ) is the set of message blocks (of length m). Any w ∈ B + is a message. Given a mapping f :
function (of length n and block size m).
Define the function f + : H × B + → H inductively as follows. For each h ∈ H, b ∈ B and x ∈ B + , let
Note that f + is nothing but an iterative generalization of the compression function f .
Let l ∈ N + and α be a nonemptyword such that alph(α) ⊆ N l . Then α = i 1 i 2 · · · i s , where s ∈ N + and i j ∈ N l for j = 1, 2, . . . , s. Define the iterated compression function f α : H × B l → H (based on α and f ) by
Note that clearly α only declares how many times and in which order the message blocks
Given k ∈ N + and h 0 ∈ H, a k-collision (with initial value h 0 ) in the iterated compression function f α is a set C ⊆ B l such that the following holds:
Define the generalized iterated hash function (a gihf for short) Hα , f : H × B + → H (based onα and f ) as follows: Given the initial value h 0 ∈ H and the message x ∈ B j , j ∈ N + , let
Thus, given any message x of j blocks and hash value h 0 , to obtain the value Hα , f (h 0 , x), we just pick the word α j from the sequenceα and compute f α j (h 0 , x). For more details, see [6] and [3] . Given k ∈ N + and h 0 ∈ H, a k-collision in the generalized iterated hash function Hα , f (with initial value h 0 ) is a set C of k messages such that for all u, v ∈ C, |u| = |v| and Hα , f (h 0 , u) = Hα , f (h 0 , v). Now suppose that C is a k-collision in Hα , f with initial value h 0 . Let l ∈ N + be such that C ⊆ B l , i.e., the length in blocks of each message in C is l. Then, by definition, for each u, v ∈ C, the equality f α l (h 0 , u) = f α l (h 0 , v) holds. Since alph(α l ) = N l (and thus each symbol in N l occurs in alph(α)), the set C is a k-collision in f α l with initial value h 0 . Thus, a k-collision in the generalized iterated hash function Hα , f necessarily by definition, is a k-collision in the iterated compression function f α l for some l ∈ N + . Now, in our security model, the attacker tries to find a k-collision in Hα , f . We assume that the attacker knows how Hα , f depends on the respective compression function f (i.e., the attacker knowsα), but sees f only as a black box. She/he does not know anything about the internal structure of f and can only make queries (i.e., pairs (h, b) ∈ H × B) on f and get the respective
We thus define the (message) complexity of a k-collision in Hα , f to be the expected number of queries on the compression function f that is needed to create a multicollision of size k in Hα , f with any initial value h ∈ H.
According to the (generalized) birthday paradox, a k-collision for any compression function f of length n can be found (with probability approx. messages [14] if we assume that there is no memory restrictions. Two remarks can be made immediately:
• In the case k = 2 approximately √ 2 · 2 n 2 hashings (queries on f ) are needed; intuitively many of us would expect the number to be around 2 n−1 .
• For each k in N + , finding a (k + 1)-collision consumes much more resources than finding a kcollision.
Of course, when attacking, for instance, against an iterated hash function based on a random oracle compression function of length n, the attacker needs a lot of computing power when n is large; to create a 2-collison requires approximately √ 2 · 2 n 2 queries on f and this is resource consuming. The paper [4] presents a clever way to find a 2 r -collision in the traditional iterated hash function H (see Remark 1) for any r ∈ N + . The attacker starts from the initial value h 0 and searches two distinct message blocks b 1 
. By the birthday paradox, the expected number of queries on f isã 2 n 2 , whereã is approximately 2.5. Then, for each i = 2, 3, . . . , r − 1, the attacker continues by searching message blocks b i and
The expected number of queries on f is clearlyã r2 n 2 , i.e., the work the attacker is expected to do is only r times greater than the work she or he has to do to find a single 2-collision. The size of the multicollision grows exponentially while the need of resources increases linearly.
The question arises whether or not the ideas of Joux can be applied in a more broad setting, i.e., can Joux's approach be used to multicollisions in certain generalized iterated hash functions?
In the following we shall see that this indeed is possible. Call the sequenceα = (α 1 , α 2 . . .) qbounded, q ∈ N + , if |α j | i ≤ q for each j ∈ N + and i ∈ N j . The gihf Hα , f is q-bounded ifα is q-bounded. Note that Joux's method is easy to apply to any 1-bounded generalized iterated hash function.
Is it possible to extend Joux's method furthermore to be adapted to q-bounded gihfs, when q > 1? This question has been investigated first for 2-bounded gihfs in [10] and then for any q-bounded gihf in [3] (see also [6] ). It turned out that it is possible to create 2 r -collision in any q-bounded gihf with O(g(n, q, r) 2 n 2 ) queries on f , where g(n, q, r) is function of n, q and r which is polynomial with respect to n and r but double exponential with respect to q.
The idea behind the successful construction of the attack is the fact that sinceα is q-bounded, unavoidable regularities start to appear in the word α l ofα when l is increased. More accurately, choosing l large enough, yet so that |alph(α l )| depends only polynomially on n and r (albeit double exponentially in q), a number p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} and a set A ⊆ alph(α l ) of cardinality |A| = n p−1 r can be found such that (P1) α l = β 1 β 2 · · · β p the word (β i ) A is a permutation of A for i = 1, 2, . . . , p; and (P2) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . .
r is a factorization of (β i+1 ) A such that |alph(u j )| = n i for j = 1, 2, . . . n p−i+1 r, then for each j 1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n p−i r}, there exists j 2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n p−i−1 r} such that alph(z j 1 ) ⊆ alph(u j 2 ). The property (P1) allows the attacker construct a 2 |A| -collision C 1 in f β 1 with any initial value h 0 so that the expected number of queries on f isã(|β 1 | 2 n 2 ). The property (P2) ensures that based on the multicollision guaranteed by (P1), the attacker can proceed and, for i = 2, 3, . . . , p, create a 2 n p−i r -collision
Thus finally a 2 r -collision of complexityã|α| 2 n 2 in Hα , f is generated. Finally on the basis of the previous attack construction and (the future) Theorem 8, the following can be proved ( [5] ).
Theorem 4
Let m, n and q be positive integers such that m > n and q > 1, f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n a compression function, andα = (α 1 , α 2 , . . .) a q-bounded sequence of words such that alph(α l ) = N l for each l ∈ N + . Then, for each r ∈ N + , there exists a 2 r -collision attack on the generalized iterated hash function Hα , f such that the expected number of queries on f is at mostã q N(n (q−1) 2 r 2q−3 , q) 2 n 2 .
Rermark 2
The inequality N(m, q) < m 2 q−1 (see Theorem 5) implies that
The results in [14] imply that, given a random oracle hash function G of length 2 n , the expected number of queries on G to find a 2 r -collision is in Ω(2 n 2 r −1 2 r ). Call a generalized iterated hash function bounded if it is q-bounded for some q ∈ N + .
Corollary 1 There does not exist a bounded generalized iterated hash function that is multicollision resistant.

Essential combinatorial results
We state a list of combinatorial results that imply Theorem 4. The main result in stated is the form of classical combinatorial theorems. For a proof, see [5] . Suppose now that A and α = α 1 α 2 · · · α p are as in Theorem 5, i.e., for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, the word (α i ) A is a permutation of A. To make our multicollision attack succeed, this is not yet sufficient. We need permutations β 1 , β 2 , . . ., β p of an sufficiently large alphabet B such that when factoring β i = β i1 β i2 · · · β id i into d i ∈ N + equal length factors for i = 1, 2, . . . , p where d j divides d j+1 and the following holds: for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p − 1} and j 1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d i } there exists j 2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d i+1 } such that alph(β i j 1 ) ⊆ alph(β i+1, j 2 ). Only then we can, starting from the first permutation (and the word α 1 ) roll on our attack well. Above the permutations β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β p are induced by the words α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α p , respectively, when α is long enough (or equivalently, the alphabet alph((α) is sufficiently large). That these permutations always can be found, is verified in the following three combinatorial results.
We wish to further study the mutual structure of permutations in long words guaranteed by Theorem 5. By increasing the length of the word α the permutations are forced to possess certain stronger structural properties. The motives are, besides our interest in combinatorics on words, in information security applications. The connection of the results to creating multicollisions on generalized iterated hash functions is more accurately, albeit informally, described in Section 5.
As the first step of our reasoning we need an application of the famous Hall's Matching Theorem. For the proof, see [6] and [3] .
Theorem 6 (Partition Theorem) Let k ∈ N + and A be a finite nonempty set such that k divides |A|. Furthermore, let {B i } k i=1 and {C j } k j=1 be partitions of A such that |B i | = |C j | for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. Then for each x ∈ N + such that |A| ≥ k 3 · x, there exists a bijection σ : {1, 2, . . . , k} → {1, 2, . . . , k} for which
The next theorem is also from [6] . It is an inductive generalization of Partition Theorem to different size of factorizations. For the proof, see [6] . 
In fact what we need in our considerations is the following 
Conclusion
We have considered combinatorics on words from a fresh viewpoint which is induced by applications in information security. Some small steps have already been taken in the new research frame. The results have been promising; they imply more efficient attacks on generalized iterated hash functions and, from their part, confirm the fact that the iterative structure possesses certain generic security weaknesses. 
